Media and social coverage of the 6 parties below, 5 Oct 2026 to 3 Nov 2026. Measured sentiment, not a poll and not a forecast.
Each bar splits all mentions between the two blocs, like a chamber. The number inside is share of voice; the shade shows net sentiment (positive minus negative). Media and social are measured separately because they rarely agree.
| Bloc | Source | Share of voice | Positive | Neutral | Negative | Net |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oposition Side | Media | 15% | 38% | 30% | 32% | +6 |
| Governmental Block | Media | 85% | 22% | 28% | 51% | −29 |
| Oposition Side | Social | 60% | 37% | 36% | 26% | +11 |
| Governmental Block | Social | 40% | 57% | 39% | 4% | +52 |
The measures of each bloc, from all the mentions of its parties: share of voice, net sentiment and, for media, the editorial share (mentions that are not press releases). Each axis is scaled to the bloc with the highest value (net sentiment from −100 to +100); the number next to each point is the measured value.
| Measure | Oposition Side | Governmental Block |
|---|---|---|
| Media share of voice | 15% | 85% |
| Social share of voice | 60% | 40% |
| Media net | +6 | −29 |
| Social net | +11 | +52 |
| Editorial share | 100% | 97% |
Each party is a dot: how media rate it (left to right) against how social posts rate it (bottom to top). Inside the shaded band, both agree. Above it, the public is kinder than the press; below it, the press is kinder than the public. Dot size is total mentions.
Largest gap between social and media sentiment: Ujedinjena Srbija (+0.52). Not enough data: Socijalistička partija Srbije (media).
| Party | Bloc | Media sentiment | Social sentiment | Gap (social − media) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Studentska lista | Oposition Side | +0.09 | +0.14 | +0.04 |
| Evropska Srbija | Oposition Side | −0.23 · low sample | +0.15 | +0.38 |
| Autentična desnica | Oposition Side | 0.00 · low sample | −0.14 · low sample | −0.14 |
| Srpska Napredna Stranka | Governmental Block | −0.47 | 0.00 · low sample | +0.47 |
| Ujedinjena Srbija | Governmental Block | +0.28 | +0.80 | +0.52 |
| Socijalistička partija Srbije | Governmental Block | no score | +0.10 · low sample | no score |
Per bloc: each bloc is one dot, from all the mentions of its parties.
Largest gap between social and media sentiment: Governmental Block (+0.64).
| Bloc | Media sentiment | Social sentiment | Gap (social − media) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oposition Side | +0.07 | +0.06 | −0.01 |
| Governmental Block | −0.21 | +0.42 | +0.64 |
Two rows per party and per bloc: the top row is media, the bottom row is social. The number on the right is net (favorable minus unfavorable).
| Party | Bloc | Source | Positive | Neutral | Negative | Net |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oposition Side | Media | 38% | 30% | 32% | +6 | |
| Oposition Side | Social | 37% | 36% | 26% | +11 | |
| Governmental Block | Media | 22% | 28% | 51% | −29 | |
| Governmental Block | Social | 57% | 39% | 4% | +52 | |
| Studentska lista | Oposition Side | Media | 43% | 23% | 34% | +9 |
| Studentska lista | Oposition Side | Social | 44% | 39% | 17% | +28 |
| Evropska Srbija | Oposition Side | Media | 0% | 67% | 33% | −33 · low sample |
| Evropska Srbija | Oposition Side | Social | 56% | 12% | 32% | +24 |
| Autentična desnica | Oposition Side | Media | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0 · low sample |
| Autentična desnica | Oposition Side | Social | 7% | 62% | 31% | −24 · low sample |
| Srpska Napredna Stranka | Governmental Block | Media | 7% | 23% | 70% | −63 |
| Srpska Napredna Stranka | Governmental Block | Social | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0 · low sample |
| Ujedinjena Srbija | Governmental Block | Media | 51% | 36% | 13% | +37 |
| Ujedinjena Srbija | Governmental Block | Social | 97% | 3% | 0% | +97 |
| Socijalistička partija Srbije | Governmental Block | Media | no score | no score | no score | no score |
| Socijalistička partija Srbije | Governmental Block | Social | 42% | 33% | 25% | +17 · low sample |
Share of voice and net sentiment of each bloc as a 7-day moving average (each value covers the 7 days ending that day). Solid lines are media, dashed lines are social. A thin dotted line without a dot bridges days with no mentions collected; the table shows “–” for them. Marked days are where media and social sentiment of that bloc differ by more than 0.30 on the -1 to +1 scale; only days with enough mentions in both sources are marked.
2 marked day(s) (bloc, social minus media); the latest: 19 Oct 2026 (Governmental Block, +0.35), 18 Oct 2026 (Governmental Block, +0.39).
| Day | Oposition Side · Media · Share of voice | Oposition Side · Media · Net | Oposition Side · Social · Share of voice | Oposition Side · Social · Net | Governmental Block · Media · Share of voice | Governmental Block · Media · Net | Governmental Block · Social · Share of voice | Governmental Block · Social · Net |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-05 | 27% | −25 | – | – | 73% | 0 | – | – |
| 2026-10-06 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 2026-10-07 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 2026-10-08 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 2026-10-09 | 23% | −33 | – | – | 77% | −10 | – | – |
| 2026-10-10 | – | – | 0% | no score | – | – | 100% | −100 |
| 2026-10-11 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 2026-10-12 | – | – | 0% | no score | – | – | 100% | −33 |
| 2026-10-13 | 22% | 0 | 0% | no score | 78% | 0 | 100% | −20 |
| 2026-10-14 | 20% | 0 | 0% | no score | 80% | 0 | 100% | 0 |
| 2026-10-15 | 15% | 0 | 0% | no score | 85% | −18 | 100% | 0 |
| 2026-10-16 | 26% | 0 | 62% | +26 | 74% | −6 | 38% | +57 |
| 2026-10-17 | 18% | 0 | – | – | 82% | −19 | – | – |
| 2026-10-18 | 18% | 0 | 61% | +24 | 82% | +10 | 39% | +58 |
| 2026-10-19 | 16% | −25 | 65% | +11 | 84% | +15 | 35% | +60 |
| 2026-10-20 | 12% | −30 | 61% | +11 | 88% | +29 | 39% | +58 |
| 2026-10-21 | 13% | −46 | – | – | 87% | +40 | – | – |
| 2026-10-22 | 13% | −46 | – | – | 87% | +40 | – | – |
| 2026-10-23 | 10% | −67 | – | – | 90% | +41 | – | – |
| 2026-10-24 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 2026-10-25 | 12% | −56 | – | – | 88% | +36 | – | – |
| 2026-10-26 | 19% | +31 | – | – | 81% | +18 | – | – |
| 2026-10-27 | 21% | +21 | – | – | 79% | −26 | – | – |
| 2026-10-28 | 22% | +43 | – | – | 78% | −71 | – | – |
| 2026-10-29 | 23% | +33 | – | – | 77% | −65 | – | – |
| 2026-10-30 | 20% | +24 | – | – | 80% | −66 | – | – |
| 2026-10-31 | 16% | +24 | – | – | 84% | −58 | – | – |
| 2026-11-01 | 16% | +29 | – | – | 84% | −60 | – | – |
| 2026-11-02 | 12% | +12 | – | – | 88% | −61 | – | – |
| 2026-11-03 | 13% | +17 | – | – | 87% | −59 | – | – |
Media and social sentiment, share of voice, topics, and reports written for whoever has to act on them.
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VoilàIQ uses AI. Always verify what matters. VoilàIQ is not affiliated with the parties listed and endorses none of them. Figures cover the tracked source set only. Data refreshed daily.